

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8738

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 CAIRO 12905

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US XF

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S MEETING WITH FAHMY
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1975

SUMMARY: IN TWO MEETINGS WITH FAHMY, DEC 21, I
REVIEWED REASONS WHY YOU HAD DECIDED TO SEND ME ON
ME MISSION AND ALSO SUMMARIZED MY TALKS IN DAMASCUS,
AMMAN, AND JIDDA. FOREMOST ON FAHMY'S MIND WAS CONCERN
OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON CONSULTATIONS. IN
THE ABSENCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CLARIFICATION, THE
MANNER IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD LEADKED THE CONTENTS
OF THE LETTER MUST INEVITABLY SUGGEST TO ARAB PUBLIC
OPINION THAT ANY FUTURE RAID WILL HAVE BEEN WORKED
OUT WITH USG. THIS WILL CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT FOR US
AND FOR GOE AS FRIENDS OF US. STRESSING OUR EXPRESSED
DISAPPROVAL OF THE RECEND RIAD, I EXPLAINED THE LETTER
FOCUSSED ITSELF ON CONSULTATION ON POLICIES LEADING TO
SUCH RAIDS, NOT ON SPECIFIC PLAN.

RE UPCOMING UNSC DEBATE, FAHMY WAS INTERESTED IN
GENERALLY NEGATIVE SYRIAN REACTION AND AGREED SYRIANS
ARE LIKELY SEEK RESOLUTION ALTER 242 AND 338 BY
RECOGNIZING IN SOME WAY OR ANOTHER PALESTINIAN
POLITICAL RIGHTS. HE THOUGHT YOUR IDEA OF HANDLING DEBATE IN TWO
STATES HAS MERIT, BUT GOE CANNOT FORMALLY SUPPORT IT.

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ANSWERING MY COMMENT THAT FAILURE

OF PLO TO RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL POSES REAL PROBLEMS FOR US, FAHMY SUGGESTED THERE MIGHT BE PARALLEL ISRAELI AND PLO RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER. FAHMY SOUGHT TO DEFEND LIKELY EGYPTIAN PARTICIPATION IN "AUCTIONEERING" DURING DEBATE IN TERMS OF OUR INABILITY AS YET TO DISCUSS WITH HIM SPECIFIC IDEAS AND POSITIONS. IF OUR POSITION ALREADY RIGID, HE SAW LITTLE POINT TO EXCHANGING INFORMATION. IF NOT, WE SHOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS WITH UNSC MEMBERS, AT HIGHEST LEVEL, HOW WE INTEND TO PROCEED. IF USG INTENDS VETO, IT SHOULD CONSULT GOE, OTHERWISE GOE WILL BE UNABLE TO COOPERATE IN UNSC, GENEVA OR ELSEWHERE. WHILE RECOGNIZING OUR DIFFICULTIES, WE TOO SHOULD RECOGNIZE CREDIBILITY PROBLEM THAT EXISTS IN THE AREA. GOE HAS YET TO PROVE THAT POLICY OF WORKING WITH US IS RIGHT AND, IF EVERYTHING EMANATING FROM US IS NEGATIVE, IT HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO "AUCTIONEER". AS HE HAD FOREWARNED US, SINAI DID CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE WHICH WE MUST NOW RECOGNIZE. ASKED WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT THE SITUATION, FAHMY PRESSED HARD FOR TWO ACTIONS: FIRST, USG SHOULD BEGIN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH PLO. HE HAD LONG URGED US TO DO SO AND HE WAS CONFIDENT SUCH AN APPROACH COULD HAVE A MODERATING EFFECT ON THE DEBATE. SECOND, WE SHOULD PRESS THE SOVIETS HARD TO WORK ON THE SYRIANS. IF, IN ABSENCE CONTACT WITH PLO, US VETOES RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS, AREA SITUATION WILL DETERIORATE AND A NEW MOVEMENT WILL DEVELOP TO EXPEL ISRAEL IN 1976. ANY US RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY DISCUSS SUBSTANCE, BUT AIM AT FORMULATING ISSUES. SOLE EFFECTIVE WAY TO GET ACROSS TO SYRIANS THAT THEIR UNSC PLANS ARE SELF DEFEATING, FAHMY CONTENDED, IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT USG/GOE RELATIONSHIP IS CONSTRUCTIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, FATAH, ON HIGHEST LEVELS, WANTS TO GET RID OF SYRIAN GRIP. SAUNDERS DOCUMENT AND OUR UNSC VOTE HAVE BEEN HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING ARAFAT.

RE JORDAN, I RELATED I HAD TALKED TO HUSSEIN AND ZAID RIFAI ABOUT THEIR CRITICISM OF SINAI AGREEMENT AND CAUTIONED AGAINST TOO CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH
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SYRIA. I HAD GAINED IMPRESSION THAT HUSSEIN, AT LEAST, MIGHT BE HAVING SOME SECOND THOUGHTS. IN ANSWER TO FAHMY'S QUERY, I CONFIRMED THAT HUSSEIN STILL HOPES TO VISIT US IN MARCH. FAHMY MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON MY ACCOUNT OF THE JIDDA VISIT.
END SUMMARY.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8739

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 CAIRO 12905

NODIS/CHEROKEE

1. INTRODUCTION: I MET WITH FAHMY TWICE DEC 21. BECAUSE OF MY DELAYED ARRIVAL IN CAIRO, FIRST MORNING SESSION WAS RELATIVELY BRIEF AND TOOK PLACE JUST PRIOR TO OUR FLIGHT TO MIT ABUL KOM FOR THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT (SEPTEL. SECOND MEETING TOOK PLACE IN THE EVENING AND LASTED ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF. HERMANN ACCOMPANIED ME ON BOTH. FAHMY, AS YOU WILL SEE, TOOK A CONSIDERABLY HARDER LINE ON VARIOUS POINTS THAN DID SADAT. AT TIMES, TOO, HE SEEMED TO TAKE CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS. SUMMARY OF OUR MEETINGS FOLLOWS:

2. CONSULATATION LETTER: IMMEDIATELY AFTER I CONVEYED YOUR GREETINGS, FAHMY BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO RABIN ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WHICH ISRAELIS HAD LEAKED. WHAT, HE ASKED, DOES THE LETTER MEAN? IT IS A VERY SERIOUS POINT. I NOTED WE THOROUGHLY DISAPPROVED OF THE TIMING AND METHODS OF THE ISRAELI RAIDS. WE NEEDED A CLOSER CONSULTATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THEIR POLICIES WHICH LEAD TO SUCH RAIDS, NOT ON SPECIFIC PLANS. FAHMY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT. IN LEAKING THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER, THE ISRAELIS HAD DONE SO IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO FURTHER THEIR OWN PURPOSE. THE IMPRESSION THEY SOUGHT TO CONVEY IS CONTRARY TO WHAT GOE KNOWS TO BE THE US PURPOSE. UNFORTUNATELY, PUBLIC REACTION TO THE LETTER IS NEGATIVE. WE HAD PROBABLY HEARD THAT IT HAS GIVEN RISE, IN THE ABSENCE OF CLARIFICATION ON OUR PART, TO MUCH PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS.

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IT PUTS THE US AND OTHERS (READ EGYPT) IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION IF THE ISRAELIS CONDUCT ANOTHER RAID, WHICH WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE INTERPRETED AS HAVING US APPROVAL, EVEN IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE. AT THE VERY LEAST, SUSPICION OF US FOREKNOWLEDGE WILL EXIST. THE SYRIAN PAPERS HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED THAT THE US KNEW OF THE PREVIOUS RAIDS.

3. I POINTD OUT THAT THE CHARGE IS COMPLETELY FALSE. PRESSING THE POINT, FAHMY CONTINUED, THAT BY SENDING SUCH A LETTER WITHOUT FULL CLARIFICATION, WE PLACE OURSELVES IN ADIFFICULT POSITION WHICH CAN CAUSE TROUBLE IN THE FUTURE. IF SUCH A LETTER HAD BEEN KNOWN TO EXIST BEFORE THE LAST ISRAELI RAIDS, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY HAVE BEEN SEEN AS HAVING TAKEN PLACE WITH US COLLUSION, ESPECIALLY ONCE WE VETOED A DONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION. IF THE US HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE ISRAELIS AND THEY RAID AGAIN AND THE US VETOES A RESOLUTION, THE US WILL BE CONDEMNED WITH ISRAEL. OR WE WILL BE FORCED INTO ANOTHER VETO. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER THE ISRAELIS, THE EGYPTIANS ARE SATISFIED.

4. I NOTED ENTIRE THRUST OF THE LETTER IS JUST THE OPPOSITE. WE HAVE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE RAID. FAHMY STATED GOE KNOWS THIS, BUT CANNOT DEFEND OUR POSITION, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN "COMPLETELY SILENT" ON THE MATTER. HE HOPED WE WOULD FIND A WAY TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR PUBLICLY ON THE MATTER. I UNDERTOOK TO TAKE THIS MATTER UP WITH YOU.

5. UNSC DEBATE: ONCE FAHMY HAD FINISHED ON THIS POINT, I WAS ABLE TO EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF TRIP. YOU HAD SENT ME WITH TWO PARTICULAR OBJECTS IN MIND. FIRST TO GET ACROSS TO THE SYRIANS BEFORE THE UPCOMING UNSC MEETING THAT WE SEE SERIOUS RISKS IN THAT MEETING IF THEY TRY TO PUSH TOO FAR AND TOO FAST IN TERMS OF A RESOLUTION. I HAD SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN OUR LIMITS. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO PASS A RESOLUTION THAT ALTERS THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK OF RESOLUTIONS

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242 AND 338 AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATING FORUM. SIMILARLY ON THE MATTER OF THE PALESTIIAN REPRESQCTATION, I RECALLED THAT WE HAVE SAID WE ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT THE MIDDLE

EAST SITUATION CANNOT BE DISCUSSED WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUES. THE LATTER HAS TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF A SETTLEMENT. THE DIFFICULTY IS TRYING TO EQUATE THE PLO AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE PROCESS. OUR PROBLEM IS, AS OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS KNOW, THAT THE PLO NEVER ACCEPTED THE EXISTING NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK OR THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.

6. FAHMY COMMENTED THAT THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS DESCRIBED IN RESOLUTION 242 AS A REFUGEE PROBLEM. I NOTED WE WOULD HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THIS RESOLUTION. I HAD CONVEYED TO THE SYRIANS THAT WE WANT TO WORK FOR AN OUTCOME THAT WE CAN SUPPORT. SO FAR AS THE PLO IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THEIR POSITION IS THE ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL, WE CAN DO LITTLE TO HELP.

7. FAHMY INSISTED THAT THE PALESTINIANS NO LONGER SAY THIS. THE ISRAELIS HAD ASKED THAT THE PLO FIRST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. THIS IS "STUPID". CONCEIVABLY, THE TWO MIGHT UNDERTAKE SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION. BUT WHAT, FAHMY ASKED, IS ISRAEL? SINAI? WEST BANK? GOLAN? GOE CANNOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL BECAUSE IT DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ISRAEL IS. WHERE IS THE ISRAELI STATE? ON EGYPTIANLAND? OR AT THE 1967 BOUNDARIES OR LESS? IF EGYPT CANNOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL, HOW CAN THE PLO BE ASKED TO DO SO?

8. I STATED THAT WE ARE SAYING THAT THE PLO SHOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS DO, I.E., ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ISRAELI STATE AS PART OF A FINAL

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

SETTLEMENT. FAHMY CONTENDED THAT THIS SHOULD REQUIRE THE ISRAELIS TO DO SOMETHING SIMILAR. THEY MIGHT SAY FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THEY WILL ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE. I POINTED OUT THAT I WAS GIVING THE US, NOT THE ISRAELI, POSITION. THE GOI SAYS IT WILL NOT DEAL WITH PLO EVEN IF IT RECOGNIZES ISRAEL. WE PROBABLY WILL HAVE DIFFICULT TALKS WITH ALLON WHEN HE ARRIVES IN EARLY JANUARY. MEANWHILE, WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE GOOD TO LET THE SYRIANS KNOW OUR POSITION BEFORE THEIRS BECAME FROZEN.

9. I HAD ALSO TAKEN UP WITH THE SYRIANS IDEA OF SEEKING TO TRANSFER THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM GENEVA TO THE UNSC. THIS IS HARDLY HELPFUL. I HAD NOT MADE MUCH HEADWAY WITH SYRIAN ON THIS POINT. ASAD HAD SAID IF THIS IS USG POSITION, HE DID NOT SEE A "WINDOW". I EMPHASIZED THAT WE WANTED TO WORK FOR AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME. I HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NOT THROUGHT THROUGH THEIR TACTICS. WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CALL TO HAVE THE PLO REPRESENTED AT GENEVA, I MADE CLEAR OUR PROBLEM. ASAD HAD BEEN PRETTY NEGATIVE. HE HAD ARGUED THAT SUCH A UNSC DEBATE, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD RELIEVE ZIONIST PRESSURE ON THE US.

10. FAHMY ASKED ABOUT SYRIAN INTEREST IN A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT ON GOLAN. HERE AGAIN I HAD
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TO TELL HIM THAT THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE WAS ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE. I HAD SPOKEN TO ASAD ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY. ASAD SAID HE WAS NOT INTERESTED UNLESS THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS ACTION WITH THE PLO.

11. IN MY SECOND MEETING WITH FAHMY, I MENTIONED SOME OF THE PERTINENT POINTS PRESIDENT SADAT HAD MADE. I HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF OUR MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS. WE WANTED TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE, IF THE USG IS PLACED IN A POSTION OF HAVING TO OPPOSE A SC RESOLUTION, WE COULD BE CHARGED WITH NOT HAVING MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR. FAHMY ASKED IF THE SYRIANS HAD UNDERSTOOD. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THEY DID. I HAD DONE THE SAME WITH THE JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS. KHALID MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP ON HIS UPCOMING TRIP.

12. I ALSO TOLD FAHMY ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ABOUT "AUCTIONEERING" AND OUR CONCERN THAT THIS NOT REACH A POINT WHERE IT LOSES TOUCH WITH REALITY. I HAD CAUTIONED ASAD THAT THIS COULD PLAY INTO HANDS OF THOSE WHO WANT TO SEE PEACE EFFORTS STALEMEATED. IF A RESOLUTION IS PROPOSED THAT CHANGES THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK, WE WILL HAVE TO OPPOSE IT. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO SEE THE SESSION SUCCEED, IF SOME "COMMON GROUND" CAN BE FOUND, IN GIVING IMPETUS TO NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

13. FAHMY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT "COMMON GROUND"? I SAID WE DO NOT YET KNOW. THE PURPOSE OF MY TRIP, I REITERATED, WAS A) TO STAKE OUT THE LIMITS OF US POSITION AND B) GET VIEWS OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS BEFORE FORMULATING OUR OWN POSITION.

14. FAHMY CONTENDED THIS IS OUR BIGGEST PROBLEM. HE WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT MY STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE NOT BEGUN TO PLAN FOR THE MEETING AND VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES. THE POINT IS NOT, HE ARGUED, WHAT GOE IS READY TO DO, BUT WHAT USG IS WILLING TO DO AND WHAT US POSITION WILL BE. IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE WHAT SAUDIS AND OTHERS WILL SAY. IF OUR POSITION IS ALREADY RIGID, HE SAW LITTLE POINT TO EXCHANGING INFORMATION. IF NOT, WE SHOULD
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BEGIN NOW TO DISCUSS WITH SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, HOW WE PLAN TO PROCEED IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. WHATEVER USG DOES WILL HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE AREA AND ON EGYPT. IF WE ALREADY MADE A COMMITMENT TO THE ISRAELIS IN SEPTEMBER AND NOW SENT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON CONSULTATION, THE ONLY PEOPLE WHO REALLY NEED ASSURANCES ARE THE EGYTPAINS. USG POSITION IS DAMAGING. IF THE US INTENDS TO VETO, IT SHOULD CONSULT EGYPT, EITHER THROUGH A SADAT-FORD LETTER OR THROUGH A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO HIM. IF THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE, EGYPT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COOPERATE IN UNSC, GENEVA OR ELSEWHERE.

15. ALLUDING TO THE DIRECTIVE TO ABDUL MEGUID WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD MENTIONED, FAHMY SAID HE WOULD SEND ONE AT THE PROPER TIME. HE PROFESSED INABILITY TO DO SO UNTIL HE KNOWS THE US POSITION. HE CAUTIONED THAT EXTENSIVE US VETOES ON ME RESOLUTIONS, AFTER OUR ACTIVE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WITH EGYPT AND THE GOLAN, IS DISAPPOINTING. IT DAMAGES THE ROLE OF THE US AND DISCREDITS THE EGYPTIAN STRATEGY.

16. GOE HAS BEEN STRESSING ITS CONFIDENCE IN USG AND FACT THAT ONLY WE CAN MANAGE THE SITUATION. GOE

HAS CREATED A CLIMATE FOR THIS AT HOME AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA. THERE ARE "PEOPLE" WHO WANT TO SEE CONCEPT FAIL. HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT USG NEED ACCEPT EVERYTHING CAIRO SAYS. GOE RECOGNIZES OUR DIFFICULTIES, BUT WE TOO MUST RECOGNIZE CREDIBILITY PROLBEM THAT EXISTS IN THE AREA. EGYPT HAS YET TO PROVE THAT ITS POLICY OF WORKING WITH THE US IS RIGHT. OUR VETO OR REFUSAL OF PLO PARTICIPATION WILL SERIOUSLY DAMAGE CREDIBILITY. IF EVERYTHING COMING FROM THE US IS NEGATIVE, GOE HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO "AUCTIONEER."

17. WE ARE AWARE, FAHMY CONTINUED OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE SINAI II. HE HAD WARNED US THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. MANY THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN DONE THAT WOULD HAVE LIMITED THE DAMAGE. HE HOPED THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

IS A LESSON TO US. BUT IF OUR POSITION IS RIGID, GOI WILL ALSO HAVE TO AUCTIONEER AND TAKE EXTREME POSITIONS. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL MEAN EGYPTIAN CREDIBILITY WILL SUFFER A SECOND TIME.

18. I SAID WE APPRECIATED THE AREA SITUATION BUT ASKED WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT IT? FAHMY OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS A YEAR AGO DID NOT WANT THE PALESTINIANS IN GENEVA, CONTENDING THIS WAS NOT PRACTICAL. THEY HAD WATERED DOWN THE (EGYPTIAN) FORMULA, WHICH HE HAD ALSO SENT TO US. HE HAD SUGGESTED THEY SHOULD GO TO THE PALESTINIANS, NOT TO HIM. WHEN THEYDID SO, THE PALES-

TINIANS WERE SHOCKED. IF THE SOVIET POSITION IS FLEXIBLE, HE WAS CONVINCED, THE SYRIAN POSITION WILL BE EQUALLY SO.

19. HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT THERE MIGHT BE A LACUNAE BETWEEN US AND A SERIOUS ONE. WE MUST FIRST TELL HIM WHAT KIND OF A "MENTAL EXERCISE" WE ARE GOING THROUGH ON THIS MATTER. HE NOTED THAT THE NEW LINEUP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEANS THAT THERE ARE MORE THAN NINE VOTES FOR ANY ARAB RESOLUTION.

20. I OBSERVED WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR A CHANCE TO USE THE VETO. WE WANTED THIS EXPLORATORY EXCHANGE BEFORE WE GO INTO A MENTAL EXERCISE, SO WE HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR FRIENDS' VIEWS. YOU HAD SENT
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ME OUT TO GIVE A MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS, NOT TO LECUTE OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS. SO FAR AS CONSULTATIONS ARE CONCERNED, WE HAD NOT AGREED TO ANYTHING WITH ISRAELIS IN SEPTEMBER THAT WE ARE NOT ALREADY DOING. NOTHING HAS CHANGED AND BOTH PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU PLACE TOP PRIORITY ON CONSULTATIONS WITH CAIRO.

21. FAHMY STILL PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND WHY YOU HAD SENT ME OUT BEFORE WE HAD DONE OUR MENTAL EXERCISE. HOW COULD HE FORMULATE HIS OWN PLAN BEFORE WE HAD DONE OUR WORK.

22. I THEN TOLD FAHMY THERE WAS ONE IDEA YOU WANTED ME TO CONVEY, WHICH I HAD NOT MENTIONED BEFORE--NAMELY, THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING A SHORT SESSION IN JANUARY WHICH MIGHT THEN ADJOURN UNTIL FEBRUARY OR MARCH. THIS WOULD ALLOW TIME TO ORGANIZE FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME OF THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION. FAHMY THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA, BUT WONDERED IF IT WAS POSSIBLE. HE COULD NOT FORMALLY SUPPORT IT. PEOPLE WOULD SAY EGYPTIANS WERE INSTIGATED BY USG AND NO FAVORABLE DECISION FOR ARAB CAUSE WOULD COME OUT OF IT. MANY DO NOT CARE ABOUT US VETO. THEY HAVE TWO OBJECTIVES: A) TO PROVE THAT EGYPTIAN LINE WAS WRONG AND B) TO OBTAIN PLO PARTICIPATION. SYRIANS WILL PUSH FOR AN EXTREME RESOLUTION. THROUGH A US VETO THEY COULD PROVE EGYPTIAN LINE WAS WRONG AND COVER UP THEIR OWN DIFFICULTIES. THEY INTEND TO SMEAR EGYPT'S REPUTATION IN THE AREA AND IN THE US.

23. HE NOTED THAT, WHILE US MAY VETO, EVERYONE OUTSIDE (EXCEPT ISRAEL) WILL CONSIDER SUCH A RESOLUTION AS HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED. WE MUST THINK ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT IS TO BE DONE IN THE FUTURE. IF US TIES ITS

HANDS, WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN IN 1976 IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY? THE SITUATION WILL "ESCALATE" AGAINST THE US IN THE AREA.

24. FAHMY AGAIN ASKED WHAT LIMITS OF OUR APPROACH WOULD BE. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD OUTLINED THESE "OUTER LIMITS" IN DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND JIDDA AS FOLLOWS: WE CANNOT
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ACCEPT ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CHANGES OR AMENDS 242 OR 338. FAHMY INTERPOSED THAT EVEN THE SYRIANS DO NOT WANT TO DO THIS. I NOTED THAT KHADDAM HAD TOLD ME HE WANTS A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEHIND 1967 BORDERS, PLO AS EQUAL PARTICIPANT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS, A SPELLING OUT OF OBLIGATIONS OF PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF TIME-TABLE TO BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER UN SYG'S SUPERVISION. FAHMY INTERRUPTED TO ASK IF KHADDAM HAD NOT ASKED FOR A NEW PALESTINIAN STATE. I SAID THIS WAS IMPLICIT. AMBASSADOR NOTED SARG ALSO WISHED REFERENCE TO NECESSITY OF IMPLEMENTING ALL RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING BY IMPLICATION 1947 PARTITION RESOLUTION.

25. I POINTED OUT ASAD'S PRESENTATION HAD BEEN MORE REFLECTIVE AND GENERAL. FAHMY SAID KHADDAM'S PRESENTATION FORESHADOWS THRUST OF SARG'S DRAFT RESOLUTION. IF SYRIANS WANT PROPAGANDA, I NOTED, OUTLOOK IS DISMAL. FAHM AGREED AND SAID IF US TIES ITS HANDS, THIS WILL BEAR ON ALL EVENTS OF 1976, AND WILL INCLUDE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM UN IN ABOUT A YEAR OR SLIGHTLY MORE. SOLE DEVELOPMENT WHICH CAN PREVENT SUCH EXPULSION IS US SUPPORTING SC RESOLUTION OR GOING TO GENEVA IN 1976, NOT TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE BUT TO FORMULATE MATTERS. I SAID IF SO, KHADDAM RESOLUTION WILL DESTROY PEACE PROCESS SINCE ISRAEL WILL TAKE ITSELF OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE MUST EXERCISE VETO POWER THIS WILL PLAY INTO HANDS OF THAT STRATEGY. FAHMY SHRUGGED THIS OFF AND NOTED GOE WILL HAVE TO SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION. I STRESSED THAT ARAB SUPPORT FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION, EVEN IF WE VETO, WILL DESTROY PUBLIC OPINION BASE WE HAVE BEEN AT SUCH PAINS TO ERECT.

26. FAHMY CLAIMED US VETO COULD NOT HURT PEACE PROCESS CRITICALLY, SINCE IT WOULD ONLY MEAN MORE ARMS FOR ISRAEL. I COUNTERED THAT IT DEFINITELY WOULD AND THAT INTRODUCTION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD "PROVE" TO MANY OF OUR CRITICS THAT USG-GOE COOPERATION WAS LEADING TO

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEAD END. AMBASSADOR RECALLED HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS FAHMY HAD MADE TO US ON UNSC STRATEGY, PARTICULARLY SUGGESTION WE ENDEAVOR WORK FOR ABSTENSIONS. FAHMY SAID, HOWEVER, THAT MEMBERSHIP HAS NOW CHANGED. LIBYANS HAVE TAKEN IRAQIS' SEAT AND PAKISTAN HAS JOINED. THE NINE VOTES ARE DEFINITELY THERE. I SAID WE CAN TRY WITH PAKISTAN AT LEAST. RIAD NOTED DAHOMEY, GUYANA TANZANIA AND ROMANIA ARE HOPELESS CASES.

27. I ASKED FAHMY HOW WE COULDGET ACROSS TO SARG THAT THEIR UNSC PLANS ARE SELF-DEFEATING. FAHMY REPLIED ONLY "PROOF" IS TO DEMONSTRATE USG/GOE RELATIONSHIP IS CONSTRUCTIVE. HE INSISTED STRONGLY THAT PALESTINIANS, ESPECIALLY FATAH, ON HIGHEST LEVELS, WANT TO GET RID OF SYRIAN "GRIP". THEY WANT TO DISENGAGE THEMSELVES FORMALLY AND FINALLY. USG MUST HELP, EGYPT MUST HELP. FRENCH ARE HELPING NOW BUT PLO IS LOOKING TO USG

28. PLO: I ASKED FAHMY IF THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLO WOULD GIVE US SOMETHING TO WORK WITH. FAHMY REPLIED CERTAINLY, BUT ONLY IF USG BEGINS ITS "MENTAL EXERCISE" AND CONTACTS PLO. PALESTINIANS ARE LOOKING FOR A RAY OF HOPE, WHICH THEY THOUGHT THEY SAW IN SAUNDERS' DOCUMENT AND USG'S VOTE IN UNSC ON NOV 30. FAHMY SAID THEY HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD AS GESTURES BY PLO. WHERE THEN, I ASKED, IS THE RECIPROCITY? FAHMY INSISTED THAT USG MUST GIVE PLO MORE "BAIT".

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EGYPT IS NOT ASKING US TO RECOGNIZE PLO OR INVITE PALESTINIANS TO GENEVA. BUT SOME FURTHER GESTURE IS NEEDED. I ASSURED FONMIN THAT US APPROACH IN SC WILL BE TOP PRIORITY ITEM FOR DISCUSSION WHEN I RETURN TOWASHINGTON AND THAT WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH GOE LATER ON THE SUBJECT.

29. FAHMY ASKED IF WE COULD SUPPORT A DRAFT WHICH DID NOT REPEAT NOT REFER TO 24 OR 338, A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD LEAVE THESE "INTACT" BUT IN WHICH REFUGEE ASPECT WOULD BE "OUT" AND PALESTINIAN "RIGHTS" WOULD BE MENTIONED IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT. IF USG IS READY TO SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION, THEN PLO MAY BE READY TO COME AROUND TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. I REPLIED I DID NOT WANT TO REJECT ANY SUGGESTION OUT OF HAND; I WAS HERE TO GET EGYPTIAN VIEWS, AND WE WOULD BE CONSULTING AMONG OURSELVES WHEN I RETURNED TO WASHINGTON. FAHMY SAID SOME EUROPEANS (HE APPARENTLY MEANT THE FRENCH) ARE SAYING THAT USG IS READY TO SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION. I AGAIN REPLIED THAT WE HAD NOT YET MADE UP OUR MINDS ON HOW BEST TO APPROACH PROBLEM. RETURNING TO MEPC ISSUE, FAHMY SAID PLO, SOONER OR LATER, MUST COME TO GENEVA. I NOTED THERE WAS NO SENSE IN HAVING A CONFERENCE WHICH INCLUDED PLO, IF ISRAEL REFUSES ATTEND. FAHMY REPLIED THAT IT WAS ABSURD TO IMAGINE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF 1977 WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE PLO. THERE MUST BE NEW ARAB SUMMIT FOR THIS. GOE IS NOW TRYING POSTPONE SUMMIT TO AUGUST BECAUSE ARAB POSITION WILL DEFINITELY BE MORE HARDLINE IN FAVOR OF PLO AFTER NEW ARAB SUMMIT. SINCE DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN SARG AND PLO, DAMASCUS IS NOT EAGER SEE PLO GARNER NEW SUPPORT. HENCE SYRIA DOES NOT WANT SUMMIT SOON EITHER.

30. I REPEATED THAT IF PLO WILL MAKE SOME MOVE TO RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, OUR POSITION COULD BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE. FAHMY REPLIED FORCEFULLY THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE. USG MUST IN SOME WAY CONTACT PALESTINIANS. AMBASSADOR NOTED FAHMY HAD TOLD US BEFORE ARAFAT WENT TO NEW YORK THAT HE WOULD BE MODERATE AT UNGA, BUT IN FACT HE WAS NOT. HOW THEN CAN WE BE SURE NOW USG'S CONTACTING PLO WOULD LEAD TO MODERATION. FAHMY SAID
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ARAFAT WAS NOT MODERATE BECAUSE USG DID NOT CONTACT PLO. IN AUGUST 1974, USG AND GOE HAD AGREED THAT USG WOULD DO SO. "YOU DO NOT LIVE UP TO WHAT YOU TELL US." BY NOT CONTACTING PALESTINIANS, FAHMY INSISTED, YOU ARE

PUTTING YOURSELVES IN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION. FURTHER, HE ADDED, IF NEWS OF CONTACT LEAKS, ARAFAT WILL BE "BURNED," HE WILL BE FINISHED. US, ON CONTRARY WILL LOSE NOTHING, SINCE US WILL HAVE CONVINCING COVER STORY. FAHMY DESCRIBED AS PARADOXICAL THE FACT THAT PLO WILL NOT SIT IN UN ORGAN WITH GOI, BUT GOI WILL NOT SIT DOWN WITH PLO.

31. I ASKED HOW SAUNDERS' DOCUMENT AND OUR UNSC VOTE HAD BEEN VIEWED BY PALESTINIANS. FAHMY SAID BOTH HAD BEEN "HIGHLY APPRECIATED" ESPECIALLY BY ARAFAT. HE REVERTED TO NECESSITY OF OUR CONTACTING PLO IMMEDIATELY, NOTING PLO UNSC REPRESENTATIVE BASIL AQL HAD SPOKEN MODERATELY UNTIL HE WAS ORDERED TO CHANGE HIS TONE, BECAUSE US HAD NOT TAKEN INITIATIVE TOWARD PLO. AS FOR NOTION HELD BY SOME USG OFFICIALS THAT GOJ CAN NEGOTIATE FOR PALESTINIANS AND THAT QUESTION OF WEST BANK GOVERNMENT COULD BE HELD OVER TO SECOND PHASE, FAHMY SAID THIS WAS POSSIBLE ONLY BEFORE RABAT. IN RABAT, IT WAS ZAID RIFAI, NOT HUSSEIN, WHO OFFERED NO HOPE TO PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK ISSUE. I RECALLED YOU HAD SAID TO FAHMY IN PAST THAT SUMMER OF 1974 WAS LOST OPPORTUNITY.

32. USSR: FAHMY EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET TACTICS IN MIDDLE EAST AND CONSEQUENT NECESSITY FOR USG TO "WORK HARD" ON RUSSIANS WITHOUT DELAY. ON GENEVA, HE BELIEVES MOSCOW WILL INSIST PLO BE PRESENT FROM FIRST DAY. BUT THIS IS MERELY BARGAINING

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POSITION. I NOTED THAT SOVIETS DO NOT TALK AS THOUGH THIS WERE MERELY BARGAINING POSITION AND THAT IF SOVIETS MEAN IT, THERE IS NO POINT IN HAVING A CONFERENCE WHICH ISRAEL WILL NOT ATTEND. AMBASSADOR SAID SOVIET DIPLOMATS HERE IN CAIRO DO SPEAK AS THOUGH PLO PRESENCE FROM BEGINNING IS SIMPLY BARGAINING POSITION, AND FAHMY AGREED THAT THIS IS HIS UNDERSTANDING.

3. FAHMY SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF SOVIETS ARE THEMSELVES AFRAID OF GENEVA. MOSCOW MAY BE USING MEPC AS SLOGAN. ON OTHER HAND, THEY MAY REALLY WANT GENEVA TO CONVENE. CERTAINLY, HE STRESSED, SHOULD USSR AND USG AGREE MEPC SHOULD CONVENE IN FEBRUARY, SOVIETS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT ENCOURAGE EXTREME SYRIAN RESOLUTION IN JANUARY.

34 AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT SYRIA'S SELF-DEFEATING STRATEGY IS NOT ONLY USG PROBLEM BUT ALSO PORTENDS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR GOE. FAHMY REPLIED THAT UNSC POSTPONEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN "EASY" HAD WE CONTACTED THE PALESTINIANS. SYRIA CAN BE INFLUENCED BY PALESTINIANS; EGYPT AND USG MUST ATTEMPT TO WORK AT SYRIANS THROUGH PALESTINIANS. OF COURSE, HE ADDED, ONLY SOVIETS CAN "FORCE" SYRIANS TO CHANGE STRATEGY. AMBASSADOR ASKED IF FAHMY MIGHT NOT BE OVERSTATING THIS SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER SARG. FAHMY SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT HE IS NOT,
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SINCE WITH PROGRESS IN AREA (LEBANON, ISRAEL), SARG MUST DEPEND ON SOMEONE AND RUSSIANS ARE THAT PILLAR OF SUPPORT. SARG PRESENTLY ASSUMES SOVIETS WILL FOLLOW DAMASCUS LEAD IN UNSC VOTE. FAHMY AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT THAT SOVIETS MUST VOTE FOR ANY ARAB RESOLUTION.

35. FAHMY, TO ILLUSTRATE SARG'S WEAKNESS, SAID THERE HAD BEEN ABORTIVE COUP IN SYRIA'S ARMY TEN DAYS AGO. AT LEAST TWENTY HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND INVESTIGATION CONTINUES. FURTHER, SYRIAN BA'ATH PARTY HAS JUST FORMALLY CENSURED SARG'S POLICY. FAHMY URGED AGAIN THAT WE SPEAK TO RUSSIANS QUICKLY.

36. JORDAN: FAHMY ASKED ABOUT THE JORDANIAN REACTION TO PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I POINTED OUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE HAPPY, DESPITE THEIR FORMAL POSITION. ASKED ABOUT THE GENERAL JORDANIAN POSITION, I SAID THAT THEY HAD TAKEN A DETACHED VIEW SAYING THEY

ARE NO LONGER DIRECTLY INVOLVED. IN JORDAN, I WANTED TO BE SURE THEY WERE AWARE OF WHAT WE HAVE SAID TO THE SYRIANS AND ALSO TO CAUTION THEM ABOUT SYRIA. THE JORDANIAN REACTION SUGGESTED THAT THEY -- AT LEAST THE KING -- MAY BE HAVING SOME SECOND THOUGHTS. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUERY, I TOLD FAHMY THAT HUSSEIN IS STILL PLANNING TO COME TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH.

37. SAUDI ARABIA: MY VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, I EXPLAINED, HAD BEEN ONE OF MY MAIN PURPOSES FOR COMING. THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN WORRIED ABOUT RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE BOYCOTT AND VISA DISCRIMINATION, ALL OF WHICH THEY INTERPRET AS DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA. IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT THIS SITUATION INTO PERSPECTIVE. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO WORK WITH THE CONGRESS ON THIS MATTER. THE PRESIDENT AND YOU WILL FIGHT TO DISSUADE THE CONGRESS FROM LEGISLATING OUR RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA OUT OF EXISTENCE. THE SAUDIS HAD NO IDEAS ABOUT THE UNSC DEBATE, BUT I HAD REVIEWED WITH THEM OUR POSITION SINCE KING KHALID IS GOING TO DAMASCUS.

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38. MY LONG TALK WITH PRINCE FAHD HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. FAHD HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE JORDANIAN ROLE IN THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN COMMUNIQUE. MOST OF OUR TALK HAD BEEN ON BILATERAL RELATIONS.

39. COMMENT: WHILE FAHMY WAS HIS CUSTOMARY COMBATIVE SELF AND, UNLIKE SADAT, AGAIN PROFESSED TO BE PUZZLED WHY I HAD COME WHEN WE HAVE NOT YET FORMULATED OUR POSITION, I THINK HE, TOO, FOUND THE MEETINGS USEFUL. APART FROM DEMONSTRATING OUR CONTINUING DESIRE TO CONSULT WITH GOE, THEY GAVE HIM A CHANCE TO AGAIN MAKE HIS POINTS, ESPECIALLY RE CONTACT WITH THE PLO. HE WAS, IN FACT, MEETING WITH ARAFAT'S AIDE, RIBBI AWWADH RIGHT AFTER OUR MEETING AND PROBABLY MADE MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD SAID IN BEHALF OF THE PLO. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, FAHMY FEELS THAT OUR LIKELY NEGATIVE POSITION WILL REQUIRE HIM TO MANEUVER IF ONLY TO PROTECT GOE'S INTERESTS IN AREA. WE WILL BE WELL ADVISED TO TRY TO CONSULT WITH GOE AS OUR OWN THINKING EVOLVES, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO TRY TO PREVENT FAHMY FROM GOING TO FAR.

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